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A B S T R A C T
This article seeks to assess the prospects of UK forensic science and technology in a post-Brexit world by
analysing four interlocking issues: Brexit itself, the evolution of national criminal justice organisational
and funding priorities, the increasing interrelationship of science and technology in the forensic domain
and the relatively disadvantaged place of forensic science and technology within the contemporary
‘scientiﬁc state’ paradigm. The results are generally pessimistic for the likely future of forensic science.
This conclusion is reinforced by scepticism about the wisdom of proceeding with Brexit. The article is
structured to identify the potential implications of British political decisions on its national forensic
science capabilities and capacity. Some aspects of the analysis are likely to have a wider resonance for
international discourse about the future sustainability of forensic science and technology, however,
particularly the interface between the globalisation of science and technology with justice.
© 2019 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Forensic Science International
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/ locat e/ f orsc i in t1. Introduction
‘Brexit’ — the process for the UK to leave the EU — will
undoubtedly have major implications for British forensic science.
Any forecast of the Brexit effect is necessarily for some time to
come conjectural. It is possible, however, to identify the most
signiﬁcant consequences of Brexit for UK forensic science and to
consider their implications alongside other developments that are
already reshaping UK forensic science capabilities and capacity.
The most noteworthy of these are scientiﬁcally and technologically
led developments: the impact of digital and cyber forensic
technologies, and the use of Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AI) in a forensic
setting. These scientiﬁc and technological changes will have a
considerable resonance for the future of forensic science beyond
the UK. The societal mediation of such changes though will reﬂect
national circumstances shaped by the general evolution of UK
criminal justice organisational priorities and funding. Hence the
importance of understanding the possible overall impact of Brexit
on the UK criminal justice system. This could work in unexpected
ways. For example, UK political and criminal justice professional
ambitions to engage in forensic DNA data sharing after Brexit have
resulted in the implementation of some (albeit limited) of the* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: tim.wilson@northumbria.ac.uk (T.J. Wilson).
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0379-0738/© 2019 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access articlelong-postponed improvements in the forensic science quality
standards regime within the UK.
Such an analysis would be incomplete without considering the
roots of what — it is suggested in this article — is the comparatively
disadvantageous place of forensic science and technology within
science and technology policy making. Benner describes the
contemporary ‘scientiﬁc state’ paradigm as the culmination of
government policies that have socialized the costs and risks of
corporate innovations ‘to enhance the competitiveness of ﬁrms on
global markets’ and notes how higher education and research have
been ‘aligned with the existing and future interests of civil society
and the economy’ [1]:
‘Knowledge has always been mobilized for political and
economic purposes, but these purposes have now become
explicitly articulated: research should reinforce and underpin
the competitiveness of nations and other geographical
entities, and ﬁrms and individuals within them; and policies
should align the cognitive aspects of research with economic
exchange’ [2].
Science applied to assist criminal justice agencies, institu-
tions and personnel in their quest for truth is naturally aligned
with the needs of civil society, but less so (or at least not always)
with economic exchange. In this respect reﬂection about
national science and technology policy serves to introduce a
cautionary note. This may give the analysis of the future UK
forensic science and technology landscape in this article
possible further international relevance. under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
2 T.J. Wilson / Forensic Science International 302 (2019) 109870The scientiﬁc community is highly globalised (alternatively ‘de-
nationalised’), [3] whether through the scientiﬁc labour market,
the organisation of major research projects, academic journals and
EAFS2018 or equivalent scientiﬁc conferences. Yet scientiﬁc
globalisation is never, as indicated above, an unmediated force.
For any ﬁeld of science to ﬂourish it is likely to need to be in tune
with its time. UK forensic science ﬂourished to an extent never
achieved before with the introduction of the DNA Expansion Policy
(2000–2005). This policy was born from the conjunction of an
existing government disposition to invest in genetic science with
political intentions to be ‘tough’ on volume crime, including
burglary [4,5]. Even at the time of this unprecedented investment
in forensic science, however, there was powerful and repeated
criticism of Government stewardship of forensic science. Succes-
sive Parliamentary reports [6] and ofﬁcial enquiries had far too
little impact on government policy, especially over independent
quality standards and access to the scientiﬁc support for defence
lawyers that is so essential in the UK adversarial legal system [7].
As UK science policy has become increasingly preoccupied with
national competiveness, forensic science looks to become pro-
gressively disadvantaged compared with other scientiﬁc domains.
This has now reached the point where the Forensic Science
Regulator has expressed concern about existential risks [8,9].
In attempting to map the prospects of UK forensic science and
technology in a post-Brexit world, this article examines the four
interlocking issues described above. Two of these are UK-centric:
(a) Brexit and (b) the evolution of national criminal justice
organisational and funding priorities. The other two are likely to
have international signiﬁcance: (c) the increasing interrelationship
of science and technology in the forensic domain and (d) the
potentially disadvantaged place of forensic science and technology
within the contemporary ‘scientiﬁc state’ paradigm. The analysis is
developed from material examined in four sections. The ﬁrst two
sections emphasise the signiﬁcance, respectively, of the nature of
Brexit as a process that will take place over several years and the EU
legal framework for criminal justice cooperation. A third section
considers the short-term implications of Brexit. The fourth section
deals with the medium-term prospects for UK forensic science and
technology in a post-Brexit world.
The material in this article is mainly conﬁned to England and
Wales (hereafter England); the other two UK territorial jurisdictions
of Scotland and Northern Ireland are different in many important
respects, but in terms of scale and the interface between the UK and
the EU, England and the UK are constitutionally synonymous and in
practice from a cooperation perspective almost identical.
2. Brexit: a process and not a single event
Brexit is not a foregone conclusion: the UK is (at the time of
writing) legally entitled to remain in the EU on its present
exceptionally favourable membership terms, [10] but Brexit is
more likely to happen than not. Also, Brexit is a process not a single
event. In addition to leaving, the UK and EU need to agree the
nature of their future relationship. The present uncertainty about
when and how Brexit will happen, and also about the short-and
medium-term consequences of Brexit could last for several years.
The process is legally determined by Article 50 TEU (The Treaty
on European Union). This creates a framework that allows the UK
and the EU to negotiate the terms of departure prior to the UK
leaving (a withdrawal agreement), but does not permit a new long-
term relationship to be agreed until after withdrawal.
Other than without a withdrawal agreement (‘a no deal Brexit’),
the UK’s secession from the EU will result in a three phased process:
a) Withdrawal (at the time of writing no later than 31st October
2019) [11]: In addition to settling ﬁnancial liabilities, thewithdrawal agreement is likely to bring into force a treaty
relationship with both temporary (for example, criminal justice
cooperation during this period) and indeﬁnite obligations
(especially to protect the position of EU 27 citizens resident
in the UK ultimately with rights enforceable at the Court of
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and to prevent under any
circumstances a ‘hard border’ in Ireland) [12].
b) A transitional period for the negotiation of the future
relationship. It has long been envisaged that this would expire
on 31st December 2020, but the draft Withdrawal Agreement
(draft WA) negotiated between the British Government and the
EU allows for a single extension to be agreed before 1st July
2020, [13] should negotiations be likely to overrun the
December deadline.
c) The long-term relationship (currently envisaged to run from
2021 onwards): this UK-EU treaty will, among many other
measures, determine the long-term criminal justice and
scientiﬁc cooperation arrangements and, as will be explained
in Section 4 below, for the UK the ultimate economic cost of
Brexit. Only at this stage will the ﬁnal implications, including
those for forensic science and technology become clear.
The long-term relationship (in whatever form it takes and
when) will be shaped by three major economic, political and
historical issues. These are the foundations on which the EU and
civil peace in Northern Ireland have been built: the Customs Union,
the Single Market and, consistent with the Good Friday Agreement
(GFA), the avoidance of a physical border between the Republic of
Ireland and the UK. Resolving these big questions is likely to take
several years and during this period future criminal justice and
scientiﬁc research cooperation will be second order consider-
ations.
3. EU criminal justice and scientiﬁc cooperation
In addition to analysing the direct consequences for UK forensic
science of Brexit, this section also notes the extent to which
political and professional ambitions to engage in forensic DNA and
ﬁngerprint data sharing have indirectly resulted in general beneﬁts
for forensic science standards within the UK.
The transformation from the Common Market to the EU was
paralleled by the development of new and increasingly compre-
hensive arrangements to protect individuals (irrespective of
national citizenship) in member states through increasingly faster
and less costly criminal justice cooperation. This can be seen
simply as ‘positive spin-offs’ from the economically driven
evolution of the European project [14]. Global public goods
(GPG) theory, however, more positively locates criminal justice,
law enforcement or security cooperation centre stage in how
governments and other institutions can work together to counter
the negative spillovers of globalisation [15,16].
A ‘No deal’ Brexit would mean the abrupt termination of all
criminal justice cooperation, including in many or all current
proceedings still dependent on such assistance. In contrast the
draft WA would freeze much of the present cooperation arrange-
ments until at least 31st December 2020. Even in this more benign
scenario there is likely to be a reduction in criminal justice
cooperation (e.g. the draft WA allows EU member states to place
signiﬁcant restrictions on extradition to the UK and less
participation in Europol information sharing). For reasons that
are explained below, however, the transitional arrangements could
prove to be better than what might become available under the
future UK-EU relationship long-term agreement.
Many criminal justice professionals, therefore, may come to
hope that the transition period will be extended as long as possible
beyond 31st December 2020. For scientists the situation is
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with Horizon 2020. Unless the future relationship is negotiated
relatively quickly British institutions may be ineligible to receive
funding from 2021 onwards under the next research programme,
Horizon Europe [17]. Given its dependence on criminal justice, the
tension between such contradictory aspirations are likely to
marginalise (or expose the existing marginalisation of) the
inﬂuence of forensic scientists within UK science policy decision
making circles. Though, as will be seen below, UK forensic science
and technology would also beneﬁt from speedy readmission on a
third country (non-EU state) basis to EU research programmes.
The EU model for criminal justice cooperation on a continental
scale is an unparalleled achievement. The existence of precedents
for some aspects of the EU cooperation model between neighbour-
ing states does not diminish the signiﬁcance of this [18]. The model
was born from a combination of high level political desire for EU
wide action on international terrorism and illicit drug trading with
earlier professional pragmatism within national policing in
response to cross-border offending. It has been argued elsewhere
that this has resulted in a transnational policing ethos (in contrast
to ‘international’ or ‘interstate’ policing) with a signiﬁcant
decoupling of professional agenda-setting and practice from
political scrutiny or judicial control [19]. While not accepting this
view, it should be noted that tensions exist over the proper scope
and constitutional validity of some aspects of EU criminal law [20].
The decoupling issue has been resolved to a great extent, however,
by locating Europol and Eurojust (also member state judicial
cooperation) in a system of EU political and judicial governance
anchored in fundamental rights law. The approach underlying EU
law governing criminal justice cooperation also generally defers to
the relevant national law of the member states involved in any
particular case. This can result in a sometimes complex relation-
ship between different sets of national rules intended to ensure
fairness in legal proceedings. Irrespective of whether tested
against Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) or Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union (CFREU), such cooperation is not always easy [21].
Forensic science and related disciplines such as ﬁngerprint
analysis have largely set their own professional agenda within this
area of EU activity. To a great extent this has been driven by a truly
international debate about the foundational validity etc. of
individual disciplines and dramatic progress in genetic science,
much of it powered by US policy development and research
funding (both public and private) [22,23]. This strong degree of
professional autonomy is reﬂected both in the original (1999–
2004) personal membership of ENSFI — conﬁned to the directors of
forensic institutions not police forces or ministries to which they
might be subordinate — and the organisation’s formal monopoly
status from 2009 onwards for forensic science within EC law
enforcement development programmes [24]. This has worked well
in the context of the Prüm system for sharing biometric forensic
data. Not only has professional cooperation overcome match
validity problems arising from the wide range of loci in variousTable 1
International Forensic DNA Multiplex Convergence [28].
Multiplex Number of national markers Over
1995 UK SGM 7 N/A 
1998 USA original CODIS 13 6 
1999 UK SGM+ 11 8 
2010 China Sinoﬁler 15 N/A 
2014 UK (England and Wales) DNA-17 17 8 
2015 UK (Scotland) DNA-24 24 13 
2017 USA CODIS core loci 20 15 (E
The table contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Li
licence/version/3/national multiplex authorised by the legislation under which Prüm
DNA proﬁle sharing was initiated, [25,26] but this has also made
possible global convergence of EU multiplex with the markers in
US and Chinese systems [27]. This is illustrated in Table 1.
Table 1 is a reminder of two lessons for the UK from the recent
history of European forensic science. First the UK beneﬁtted
considerably from the involvement of its now closed public sector
forensic science institution, the FSS, in ENSFI and EC funded work
to ensure overlap between different multiplex systems to make the
international sharing of information between forensic DNA data
more reliable. Second, while ultimately bioscience companies
provided the multiplex kits, public sector scientiﬁc institutions
were needed to either set or encourage a collaborative interna-
tional agenda [29]. The signiﬁcant risk of at least a temporary exile
of UK institutions from EU research programmes during the
transition period makes a decline in the global inﬂuence of UK
forensic science and technology institutions likely. The degree of
damage will depend on the time required to negotiate the new
long-term relationship and the extent to which this would then
allow the UK to participate on the model of other third countries
(non-EU states, e.g. Switzerland). (This is, of course, contrary to the
potential internal tensions over the length of the transition period
described above that are likely to be encountered by forensic
scientists within UK science policy decision making circles because
of the formers’ subordination to criminal justice policy makers).
Against the background of EU achievements, it is not surprising
that there is an almost complete UK political consensus that the
country should seek to continue to participate in security and
criminal justice cooperation with the EU after Brexit. For example,
one Parliamentary committee in March 2017 welcomed:
‘the Government’s signals that it intends to continue to
cooperate with the EU on criminal justice. The seriousness of
the matter and the degree of mutual interest give weight to the
suggestion that this aspect of negotiations be separated ﬁrmly
from others . . . .it is too precious to be left vulnerable to tactical
bargaining’ [30].
Academically, however, there was very early recognition that
the UK would no longer be able to (indeed, should not) continue, its
Lisbon Treaty entrenched position to ‘cherry pick’ and maintain its
current unbalancing participation in the ASFJ acquis [31]:
‘[The] . . . exceptional status for the UK allowed it to beneﬁt
from a totally unusual pick and choose capacity, leading to risks
of deep imbalances for the European criminal justice area.
. . . Allowing some Member States to avoid a part of the acquis
brings with it the risk of ending up with serious imbalances,
compromising the establishment of a genuine European
criminal justice area’ [32]
‘The price of the security beneﬁts of EU cooperation will be full
compliance with the EU acquis, including the acquis on the
protection of fundamental rights: a paradoxical outcome with
the UK having to accept more EU law than it currently does as an
EU Member’ [33].lap between UK and US markers Overlap between UK and Chinese markers
N/A
Unknown
Unknown
9
10
14
ngland and Wales) 20 (Scotland) N/A
cence v3.0. Link to Licence: http://nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-
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outcome for the UK of the exit process — as with the three major
economic and political issues highlighted earlier in this paper —
depends on ‘the kind of bargain the EU [is] willing to offer’ [34].
In turn the EU has little freedom to depart from the logical
consequences of the treaties on which it (as a polity) is based and
the inter-state relationships these have established:
There is a strong sense in Brussels that they cannot give the UK
better treatment than they are giving to third countries that are
part of Schengen [The UK] will need to have a procedure that
. . . the [EU] considers to be fair and according to human rights.
If the UK decides to pull out of [CFREU] that will pose a problem
. . . That means that any extradition deal . . . will be constantly
scrutinised, because the UK will no longer be part of the mutual
trust system that allows member states to be so quick in
exchanging information, people and so on [35].
Access to the SIS (Schengen Information System) II system that,
inter alia, contains details of outstanding arrest warrants and
terrorist suspects — not available to Denmark (despite its status
within the EU and Schengen area) — but highly desirable for the UK
is relevant in this context [36].
To some extent there appeared to have been progress (within
the UK Government) during the withdrawal negotiations, with
Prime Minister May acknowledging in February 2018 that, against
an early anxiety in her premiership about a continued role for the
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in UK criminal justice
needed to be subordinate to continued UK-EU cooperation:
It must be respectful of the sovereignty of both the UK and the
EU’s legal orders. So, for example, when participating in EU
agencies the UK will respect the remit of the European Court of
Justice [37].
In March 2018, Prime Minister May was even more explicit. She
stated that ‘even after we have left the jurisdiction of the [CJEU], EU
law and the decisions of the CJEU will continue to affect us’ [38].
Commission thinking does not appear to be strategically far
apart from that of the British negotiators, envisaging a future
criminal justice and security partnership based on four building
blocks: effective exchange of information; support for operational
cooperation between law enforcement authorities; judicial coop-
eration in criminal matters; and measures against money
laundering and terrorism ﬁnancing [39]. The European Parliament,
however, has reminded the negotiators that after Brexit, the nature
of UK participation in criminal justice cooperation will have to
change signiﬁcantly because third countries (outside the Schengen
area) do not beneﬁt from any privileged access to EU instruments,
including databases, in this ﬁeld. It expects separate arrangements
. . . to be found with the UK as a third country as regards judicial
cooperation in criminal matters, including on extradition and
mutual legal assistance, instead of current arrangements such asFig. 1. The estimated weekly net ﬁscal loss to the UK Government resulting from Brex
Data sourced from J Portes, Putting a price on Brexit [48].the European Arrest Warrant’ [40]. Whatever form the new
relationship takes, it will need to be based on the ‘inextricable link
between mutual trust, mutual recognition, respect for fundamen-
tal rights and membership of the EU (which includes the
jurisdiction of the CJEU)’ [41].
It is impossible that such complex (legal and operational) and
politicallysensitivearrangementscanbenegotiatedquicklyafterBrexit.
The best outcome would be to preserve as much of the present
arrangements as possible at the moment of Brexit, as is anticipated in
the draft WA [42]. These temporary arrangements may then need to
remain in force for several years beyond the envisaged period for
transition (which could end as early as 31st December 2020), while a
new security and criminal justice relationship is worked out. In the
meantime the political and professional ambitions toengage in forensic
DNA data sharing outlined above have indirectly resulted in a limited
general beneﬁt for forensic science standards within the UK. One of the
problemsthattheForensicScienceRegulator’squalitystandardsregime
has consistently faced has been the lack of statutory powers to require
compliance with the standards. This changed in 2018 when secondary
legislation was brought into force for mandatory standards compliance
for all forensic DNA and ﬁngerprint analysis work speciﬁcally to satisfy
the rules of the Prüm data sharing regime. As the Forensic Science
Regulator commented in her 2019 Annual Report:
Without a doubt it was the imminent legal requirement to gain
accreditation, as a result of the Accreditation of Forensic Service
Providers Regulations 2018, by which 2009/905/JHA is being
transposed into UK law, that ﬁnally enabled progress to be
made. This has clearly demonstrated that some organisations
will only comply with standards when they are required to by
law; a clearer case for statutory powers for the Regulator would
be difﬁcult to make [43].
4. The short-term implications of Brexit
The starting point for any consideration of the short-term
implications of Brexit has to be its likely ﬁscal impact. There is a
reasonably clear consensus between economists (including those
based in the UK ﬁnance ministry, HM Treasury) that the more the
UK moves away from the EU in terms of tariffs and Single Market
rules, the greater the loss to its GDP and ﬁscal income. It has been
estimated that by 2030 a ‘hard Brexit’ (major disengagement from
the EU over tariffs and standards) would reduce cumulative GDP
growth by 18% compared to a situation where the UK continued its
EU membership. Closer future relationships would still cost 10–
12.5% of cumulative growth over the same period [44]. An analysis
of government data against four post-Brexit relationship options
between the UK and the EU makes it possible to illustrate the
impact of the consequential weekly net ﬁscal loss graphically
(Fig. 1) as a percentage of current weekly public health care (NHS)it presented as equivalent to current weekly NHS spending.
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for UK exit payments to be spread over a long period, with an
estimated 75% being paid by 2022 (with the rest continuing until
possibly the 2060s) [46], ‘there is likely to be virtually no “Brexit
dividend” in [the short-term] . . . that could be diverted to fund
public services.’ Any small net savings in EU contributions could be
easily exceeded by higher UK administration costs resulting from
Brexit, for example, on expanded border controls and immigration
enforcement systems [47].
The worrying potential ﬁscal consequences of Brexit have to be
considered against widespread problems in UK government
services (both national and municipal) resulting from ﬁscal
austerity (budget cuts). These were initiated in response to the
2008 ﬁnancial crisis. The scale of public sector budget cuts has
been masked to some extent by the erosion in real terms (i.e.
allowing for inﬂation) of staff salaries, but the overall pattern,
signiﬁcance and managerial response for the purposes of this
paper can be illustrated from the decline in police expenditure (the
main source of forensic science and technology expenditure):
 Between 2010–11 and 2018–19 police forces in England and
Wales experienced real-term reductions in funding ranging from
11% to 25%.
 The total number of employees in those forces fell by 18% (within
that the number of police ofﬁcers fell by 15%) between March
2010 and March 2018 [49].
The net effect of this on key outcomes in the criminal justice
system and crime trends cannot be assessed with precision, but a
2018 Parliamentary report noted that:
‘Many ‘volume’ crimes, including robbery, theft from the
person, and vehicle-related theft, are now increasing at an
alarmingly steep rate, after a long period of decline. While
recorded crimes have risen by 32% in the last three years, the
number of charges or summons has decreased by 26% and the
number of arrests is also down’ [50].
Forensic science and technology work commissioned by the
police, CPS and defence lawyers has been almost perpetually
trapped within a cycle of declining funding and professional
morale [8,51]. Notwithstanding trenchant criticism in the Review of
the Criminal Courts of England and Wales (2001) [53], the problem of
inadequate publicly funded forensic science access for defence
lawyers was never remedied. Instead this historic problem was
compounded by the ﬁscal austerity policies. initiated after 2008
[54]. During the present decade such recessionary trends have
affected forensic science and technology funding (all data
estimated in real terms) generally:
 Despite an exponential increase in digital forensics, there was a
10 year decline in England and Wales in forensic science
expenditure in the order of 28%.
 The above overall change masks an increase in internal police
spending of 10% through a decline in external spending (on
independent scientiﬁc and technology services) of some 65%.
 A 2017 target (Future Forensics OBC (FFOBC)) to reduce forensic
science expenditure (based on a slightly different range of
criminal justice agencies) in real terms — both external and in-
house services (including digital forensics) — by 43% over the
next 10 years.
The data behind these trends and plans is generally robust and
the overall picture is clear, but detail is lacking and as a result the
exact signiﬁcance of these ﬁgures — as generally crime volumes
and evidence costs (especially with digital evidence disclosure)
have changed signiﬁcantly because of digital and cyberdevelopments and many standard forensic science processes have
become more efﬁcient — is highly contestable [55].
No wonder that the Forensic Science Regulator has written of
‘existential threats’ and forensic science providers struggling to
survive [8]. The police (the main funders of UK forensic science), as
shown above, have faced major problems because of ﬁscal
austerity and have sought to manage the consequences of this
by prioritising the retention of ﬂexible capabilities by protecting
their most experienced cadre of staff, police ofﬁcers. The problem
with the present forensic science funding, management and
governance arrangements is that police priorities may necessarily
differ from equally legitimate priorities within forensic science and
for the criminal justice system as a whole.
Brexit could accelerate rising UK crimes trends. The politics of
Brexit — especially talk of ‘retaking control of [UK] borders’ —
frequently misrepresents it is consequences for the continued
protection of security and well-being in the UK. More restrictive
immigration rules will not reduce the scale of cross-border
movement. When the UK joined the Common market its resident
population exceeded by three times the total number of cross-
border movements (excluding with Ireland). Today that situation
has been more than reversed. Offending by nationals from other EU
member states is disproportionately lower than the size of this
group within the UK population [57]. The challenge, therefore, has
been and will continue to be that of identifying a small group of
criminals within the overwhelmingly law-abiding and tax-paying
crowd travelling to the UK from 27 EU states. Speedy and efﬁcient
EU information sharing (e.g. forensic bioinformation and, also for
safeguarding purposes, criminal records) has been critical for this
[58]. It is absolutely clear that the UK government department
responsible for border security and policing, the Home Ofﬁce, has
well-founded concerns that Brexit, particularly of the ‘no deal’
variety will weaken border security [59]. A leaked letter
originating from senior police circles has revealed anxieties about
‘signiﬁcant risks to our local communities’ and a forced switch to
more expensive and ‘sub-optimal’ policing should access be denied
to EU databases such as SISII used to search for terrorist suspects,
particularly with a possible ‘no deal’ scenario [60].
The prospect of increased pressures on criminal justice and
security capabilities and budgets are paralleled by potentially
wider problems. Should Brexit result in a UK ﬁrmly outside the
Customs Union and Single Market, there will need to be an
extension and deepening (in terms of arrival checks) of UK Border
controls. (Not all checks will need to be made at the border itself.)
For example, increased volumes of documentation about the safety
and security of goods entering the UK will need to be veriﬁed. Some
of this may require more scientiﬁcally and technically qualiﬁed
staff to test compliance with food and product safety regulations
[61]. The complexity and timescale of what is required is a
consideration that lowers the risk of a ‘no deal Brexit’. In addition
to this resulting in the maximum amount of long-term damage to
the UK economy, it would also mean major ﬁscal losses (not just
customs tariffs, but also VAT and duties on goods such as tobacco
and alcohol). The NAO have estimated that total cost of ‘no deal’
disruption could be some £40 billion or more over a twelve month
period [62]. Both factors could intensify further budget pressures
elsewhere in the UK public sector, including on police budgets and
forensic science expenditure.
One ameliorating factor for such public expenditure pressures
is that recent moves to reduce or even cease funding the cost of
border control as a public good might continue. As Table 2
illustrates 89% of the cost of the UK border control and immigration
system is now funded directly by those crossing the border, or
anticipating such travel or seeking to establish their legal status to
do so, with substantial cross-subsidy from purchased services such
as passports and visas.
Table 2
Funding the UK Border and Immigration Control Systems in 2017–18 [63].
Function Cost £m Income £m (as % of Cost) Balance £m
Border Force (securing the border, managing ﬂows of people and also goods entering the UK) 522.6 22.2 (4.3%) 500.4
Borders, Immigration & Citizenship Policy and Strategy Group 38.1 5.1 (13.4%) 33
Immigration Enforcement 430.8 33 (7.6%) 397.8
UK Visas & Immigration 1,100 1,600 (145.5%) +500
HM Passport Ofﬁce 263.7 435.6 (165.2%) +171.9
Total 2,355.2 2,095.9 (89% of costs) 259.3 (11% of costs)
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border control and the immigration system (excluding asylum
functions) should be cost neutral (no net public sector funding)
[64]. This and similar policies could not, however, signiﬁcantly
reverse the general ﬁnancial pressures on criminal justice budgets
described in this section.
5. Brexit and the medium-term prospects for UK forensic
science and technology
The most likely direct medium-term Brexit risk for UK forensic
science is exclusion from and a loss of inﬂuence within the EU
research community and professional isolation. The increased
fragility of the UK forensic science research and case work
capabilities have been partly counterbalanced by British forensic
science institutional membership ENSFI and participation in EC
funded research projects [65]. The fundamental problem for the
future will not just be the consequences of Brexit, but will also
reﬂect a damaging historical legacy from the twentieth century
whereby English forensic science and medico-legal infrastructure
was funded late and inadequately in contrast to other major
European countries [66,67] combined with the decade-long steep
decline in funding analysed earlier in this paper.
The underlying cause of these problems, however, is not so
much inadequate funding as one of organisational fragmentation:
narrowly focused public service priorities and responsibilities with
little or no space for independent scientiﬁc and legal inﬂuence over
resource allocation and policy making, or even a balanced
consideration of the bigger picture. Such organisational fragmen-
tation creates problems when attempting to measure inputs,
assess signiﬁcance, identify departmental responsibilities and ﬁnd
strategic solutions to the problems relating to forensic science and
technology. It may also inhibit initiatives to strengthen forensic
science and technology institutions by expanding their activities
into areas more aligned to the commercial beneﬁts envisaged
under the contemporary scientiﬁc state paradigm.
The nature of such concerns can be illustrated by three
examples of how traditional notions of forensic science are
changing:
a) The recent Novichok incidents demonstrated how the Defence
Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl), which is controlled
and funded by the UK defence ministry, can acquire a criminal
justice dimension. These incidents also illustrate how major
costs — the multi-milion pound ‘clean-up’ managed by Defra
(The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs) [68]
— resulting from a forensic science guided response and the
source of that guidance can fall on other departmental budgets.
Such forensic science from outside the traditional or main-
stream criminal justice science community can be of a very high
standard and fully integrated with mainstream provision in
terms of quality assurance. For example, in 2013 Dstl scientists
provided the ﬁrst authoritative scientiﬁc conﬁrmation that
chemical warfare agents had been used in Syria. The
international scientiﬁc credibility of the laboratory’s workwas enhanced by independent accreditation to the internation-
al standard ISO 17025:2005 and compliance with the Forensic
Science Regulator’s (FSR) Codes of Conduct [69].
b) The Randox Testing Services result reporting scandal reveals
limitations in the conventional approach to the ﬁnancial
analysis of criminal justice costs as in the previous section of
this paper. This scandal exposed questions about the reliability
of some 10,000 toxicological test reports (mainly driving, but
also family (child custody) and civil courts (employment cases).
With contingent fee (‘no win no fees litigation) the greater part
of the cost of this failure will be determined in civil litigation (in
the English sense of non-criminal proceedings) as the
individuals affected by the scandal seek ﬁnancial compensation
for damage and disruption to their lives. It will amount to a
considerable sum, but will not be counted in any government
analysis of forensic science expenditure [70].
c) A Government Chief Scientiﬁc Adviser’s (Professor Sir Mark
Walport) Annual Report (2015) (Walport Report) was sub-
titled Forensic Science and Beyond: Authenticity, Provenance
and Assurance to remind scientists that the forensic science
they practise or use also has broader societal and economic
purposes consistent with the scientiﬁc state paradigm. It also
exposed further limitations in the institutional knowledge of
the true extent of more traditionally conceived forensic science
activity. Even if ‘establishing provenance and authenticity and
giving assurance in areas such as environmental protection,
food and drink, pharmaceuticals and consumer products’ [71],
results in criminal prosecutions, these are rarely included in
police crime data [72].
The arguments advanced by Walport for new thinking about
the scope of forensic science did not extend to questions about the
governance or strategic oversight of forensic science. This issue
gains additional traction from the extent to which — with the
exception of major terrorist incidents, other serious crimes and
crises such as the Randox reporting scandal — forensic science is
less signiﬁcant to senior police decision makers (its principal
paymasters in the UK) than might be thought. Police forces have
estimated that all crime accounts for only 22% of the number of
police emergency and priority incidents [73]. A high proportion of
crime, in any case, will not require any or extensive forensic work.
Also the nature of crime is changing. The ONS (UK national
statistical authority) has estimated that by 2015 53% of UK crime
had become either cyber-dependent or cyber-enabled [74]. This
correlates with the fears at that time shared by 89% of UK internet
users who believed that the risk of becoming a victim of
cybercrime was increasing [75]. Against this background senior
professional and political focus and funding priorities have moved
away from the advanced forensic science initiatives at the end of
the last century (e.g. DNA in volume crime investigation) to
developing the capability to deal with cyber-enabled or enhanced
crime that can threaten national security or public service
functionality and the problems arising from large volumes of
digital evidence. Loveday describes a situation in which UK
policing is wrestling with competing challenges [76], yet, as
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squeezed and recent failures, such as disclosure errors in the
investigation of serious sexual crimes, have weakened Parliamen-
tary and public conﬁdence in criminal justice [77]. The decline in
senior police engagement with many key forensic science
disciplines can be inferred from the hitherto tardy performance
— other than in respect of digital forensics — compared with Dstl
and the main commercial forensic providers, of police laboratory
and ﬁngerprint bureaux in achieving independent accreditation
and compliance with regulatory standards [78].
Reaching judgements about the nature, signiﬁcance and scale of
problems that affect the ability of forensic scientists and technologists
to contribute to a system of justice that is both fair and efﬁcient are
beset by problems of deﬁnition and poor data, but there appears to be
general agreement that the present system is unsustainable. The
governmental view or at least that from within policing expressed in
the Future Forensics Outline Business Case (OBC) makes it clear that
forensic science and technology cannot serve justice and public safety
by continuing on its current trajectory [79]. The organisational
challenges, as the major changes envisaged in that document are
made, will be in ensuring transparency, accountabilityand sufﬁciently
wide participation in what should be a long-term and strategic
process, not simply a cost-cutting exercise.
While there are strong arguments for fundamental change to
address problems arising from fragmented departmental respon-
sibility for forensic science that can be made only by government,
the forensic science community also needs to be proactive in
reacting to new opportunities and challenges. Three possible
examples suggested solely to illustrate this general observation
about the need for new thinking within both government and the
scientiﬁc community are given below:
a) Possible post-Brexit border controls: consistent with observations
in the Walport Report (quoted above) about the signiﬁcance of
forensic science in areas such as environmental protection, food
and drink, pharmaceuticals and consumer products, Brexit is
likely to create new demands for government provided or
purchased scientiﬁc services. The National Audit Ofﬁce (NAO)
have identiﬁed, for example, how monitoring control and
certiﬁcation systems may need to be expanded for the import
and export of live animals and animal products, as well as many
plants [80]. With the UK Government’s self-funding approach to
border control the introduction or expansion of such services
may not compete directly with criminal justice expenditure. It
could, especially in the overall climate of decline in criminal
justice work, result in an exodus from criminal justice by
scientists willing to retrain and companies seeking better
opportunities in public health and regulatory science? Would
that amount to a threat to the UK forensic science community,
or present an opportunity to strengthen UK forensic science by
broadening its professional, institutional and economic base?
b) Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AI): the introduction of AI or machine
learning into decision making within the criminal justice
system has given rise to fundamental epistemological, stand-
ardisation and ethical questions of the kind that forensic
scientists have been engaged with for decades. For example,
questions asked in an inquiry undertaken by the largest English
legal professional body, the Law Society, into the likely
transformational impact of technology on criminal justice,
including algorithmic decision making, included:
 How can we review/disclose decisions made by the algorithm?
 What are the post-implementation oversight mechanisms to
identify bias in algorithmic decision making?
 Can the accuracy of the algorithm be validated regularly? [81]
c) Digital evidence: The ﬁnancial impact on forensic science
budgets of the exponential increase in recent years in digitalforensics was noted in Section 4 above. What has already
received much greater public and parliamentary attention,
however, is shared legacy of disclosure failures. The failure to
disclose exculpatory evidence to defence lawyers threatens the
fairness of a criminal trial. This is not an abstract principle. A
senior prosecution ofﬁcial has admitted to MPs that some
people had been wrongly imprisoned because of such errors.
Disclosure problems are not new (they were highlighted in ﬁve
reviews between 2011 and 2017), nor conﬁned to technological
or scientiﬁc evidence. But widespread ownership and use of
digital devices has transformed the volume of potential
evidence. It has been is estimated that an average of 35,000
pages of data can be downloaded from every single mobile
device examined by the police. This data requires skilled
analysis to identify robust evidence that is admissible in court.
Also sufﬁcient staff time is needed to be to identify potentially
exculpatory evidence that should be disclosed to defence
lawyers. Problems with disclosure resulted in the high-proﬁle
collapse of a number of cases between December 2017 and
spring 2018 or in convictions being quashed [82].The forensic
science and technology provider community has a signiﬁcant
role to play in preventing such failures.
6. Conclusions
This article has analysed the factors — in terms of four
interlocking issues — that will determine the prospects for UK
forensic science and technology in a post-Brexit world: Brexit
itself, the evolution of national criminal justice organisational and
funding priorities, the increasing interrelationship of science and
technology in the forensic domain and the relatively disadvan-
taged place of forensic science and technology within the
contemporary ‘scientiﬁc state’ paradigm. The results are pessimis-
tic for the likely future of UK forensic science and technology.
Uncertain times, however, also offer new strategic opportu-
nities, for example, a potential opportunity, perhaps, to strengthen
UK forensic science by broadening its professional, institutional
and economic base by reacting positively to any changes in forensic
science — broadly conceived — such as new opportunities in public
health and regulatory science. Similarly major questions about
digital evidence, cyber-enabled or cyber-dependant crime and the
potential impact of AI within the justice system will have a
resonance for many within the forensic science community. There
is likely to be at a minimum great value from forensic scientists
sharing insights about the problematic interface of law with
science and technology. This could be taken, however, further by
realigning professional bodies, governance and public institutions
within what might be become a single and more uniﬁed forensic
domain — for professional, regulatory and policy making purposes
(including resource allocation and research coordination) — of
science and technology.
A ﬁnal comment, however, is reserved for an almost remorse-
less emphasis in national science policies that research should
reinforce and underpin the competitiveness of nations. This is very
clearly expressed in the Walport Report. The report provided a
welcome and stimulating review of traditional conceptions of
forensic science and its value, much of which is reﬂected in this
article. Walport’s ﬁnal conclusions, however, were very much
focused on the dominant science policy paradigm:
Forensic techniques can be used to demonstrate provenance
and authenticity in ways that could increase conﬁdence in
markets and, in some cases, create new business models.
Knowing, with a high degree of assurance, the provenance of
food or clothes, or the authenticity of the antique or the exotic,
8 T.J. Wilson / Forensic Science International 302 (2019) 109870will offer opportunities for businesses to add value in new
ways . . . . . .
. . . In conclusion, there are important existing and new
opportunities for the application of forensic and analytical
science and technology. The need for the effective application of
these is growing rapidly as citizens increasingly use and provide
globalised markets and services, and, in doing so, expand the
uses of the internet and world wide web. . . . [83]
This shows how the contemporary paradigm can be applied —
to create new professional and institutional opportunities — to
aspects of forensic science and technology. Yet it is also necessary
to distinguish such commercial strategies from tasks that are
ultimately concerned with justice and need to be funded as a
public good. It is essential to distinguish between the scope for
economic exchange and activities where there is no alternative to
public funding that is sufﬁcient to ensure the sustainability of
science and technology within criminal justice and related areas of
litigation (e.g. in family and public health matters) in a manner
consistent with a civilised society.
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